A U.S. Army major met a Russian officer at a defense exhibition in Washington and, as soldiers do, they soon started talking shop. The American disclosed that he was an armor officer who had just finished a tour of duty with the OPFOR, or opposing force, at Fort Irwin in the California desert.
He explained that the OPFOR wore Russian-style uniforms, drove tanks modified to look like Russian tanks, and employed Russian tactics, all to give American soldiers a look at how Russian tankers fought. The Russian, also an armor officer, listened, then said: “We know a lot about your OPFOR. It’s better than it has to be.”
With training like that, U.S. armed forces are undoubtedly the best trained in the world. American soldiers and marines spend more time in the field, sailors more time at sea, and air crews more time flying than any other forces. This is a crucial element in U.S. power — and evidence that America, contrary to a widening opinion, is not in decline.
Global Security, a think tank in northern Virginia, says Fort Irwin pits American soldiers in a harsh environment against a formidable opposing force. The OPFOR “trains Army combat units to a demanding standard, using realistic scenarios and providing meaningful feedback to soldiers, leaders and staffs at every level, platoon to brigade.”
In the air, the Air Force and the Navy try to have fighter pilots put in 20 to 22 hours of flight time a month. That does not include briefing or debriefing on the ground or any other duties. Intelligence officers say Chinese pilots get about 10 hours in flight time each month. One said: “North Korean pilots would be lucky to get 20 hours a year.”
All that training, however, is costly, being the largest expenditure in the military budget. The current budget’s base is $553-billion, of which $204 billion, or 37 percent, is allotted to operations and maintenance, most of which goes into training. It is a military axiom that good training makes for missions accomplished with less loss of life or limb.
Another expenditure, for personnel, also sets U.S. armed forces apart from others. American taxpayers, to their credit, pay men and women in the volunteer force a living wage, unlike other large armed forces that rely on a draft and pay their soldiers and sailors a pittance. This costs $141 billion a year, or 25 percent of the defense budget.
Nobody joins the army to get rich but a middle-grade enlisted man or woman such as an Army sergeant or a Navy petty officer second class with four years of service and is married with two children is paid about $54,000 a year in base pay, quarters, rations, and benefits.
Critics of U.S. defense spending—at home or abroad—often focus on multi-million dollar aircraft or billion-dollar warships when they call for cuts. But the procurement of bullets, beans, and bandaids, at $113 billion a year, comprises 20 percent of the budget and is hard to trim because much is in long term programs with powerful political backing.
Those critics often assert that the U.S., which spends just under 5 percent of its national wealth on military power, has a defense budget that is larger than those of the next six to eight to 10 other nations combined, the figure depending on who is counting what.
That, however, is a meaningless measure because no other nation has taken on the far-flung commitments of the U.S. that are a consequence of World War II, the Cold War, the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It is simplistic to argue that the U.S. should shed its responsibilities to international security and walk away.
Instead, the critics would do better to urge American political leaders to serve the common interest by demanding that other nations pick up a greater share of the burden for the common defense. In Japan, for instance, a lack of political leadership precludes that nation from doing its fair share. In South Korea, much the same is true.
Put another way, the key question is not how much the U.S. spends but whether it is buying the right things — and whether in the procurement of weapons and equipment is an efficient and as effective as it could be. Surely, the American taxpayers are providing good training and good people for the armed forces.
Whether the taxpayers are getting their money’s worth in weapons and equipment and in the management of the Pentagon is another question — and an issue for another day.
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About the Author
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Richard Halloran, who writes the weekly column called “The Rising East,” contributes articles on Asia and US relations with Asia to publications in America and Asia. His career can be divided into thirds: One third studying and reporting on Asia, another third writing about national security, and the last third on investigative reporting or general assignment. He did three tours in Asia as a correspondent, for Business Week, The Washington Post, and The New York Times, and was a military correspondent for The New York Times for ten years. He is the author of Japan: Images and Realities and To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America’s Endangered Defenses, and four other books. As a paratrooper, Halloran served in the US, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. He has been awarded the George Polk Award for National Reporting, the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, the U.S. Army’s Outstanding Civilian Service Medal, and Japan’s Order of the Sacred Treasure. He holds an AB from Dartmouth